| | Dailey,
I'm still waiting to find out which other ones you generically refer to. I already told you: google the empiricists. If you want the reverse - that induction depends on deduction - google some rationalists. The question of how induction and deduction relate is a big deal for both parties. You apparently didn't notice this answer, both in post 8 and in 16. If you expected a more specific answer, you expected wrong. I don't have time to dig up specific names for you. And I don't want to risk giving you wrong names by popping them off the top of my head.
I repeat: you've 'responded', yes...but...not 'answered' (to emphasize redundantly: relevently responded.)
Again, how can I "answer" when your view is incoherent? You really don't get this. If it's not about comprehension, then it makes no sense to me. Is it so impossible for you to believe that your argument was unclear? Two other discussers appeared to understand it, but this isn't about them. Are you so arrogant that you can't simply reword the damn thing and provide at least one example? Perhaps you just lack the ability. Very well. I'll point out where your post 4 stops making sense to me.
Deduction, when used, has an expectation of the next 'use' of it staying consistently the same as the last use. Yup, people expect that "A is B; B is C; therefore A is C" to produce a true conclusion just as it did in its last use. No problem with this part.
Such an expectation is an induction, no? (induction DOES imply expectation, now, doesn't it?) If the expectation is developed by generalizating from repeated observations of deductive syllogisms, then yes.
In short: any 'validity' to deduction...logically...requires acceptance of the 'validity' of induction's use, at least on THAT subject/process. This doesn't follow. Deduction's validity doesn't logically require the inducer to have an inductive expectation of it. Deduction is valid with our without induced expectations of it. "A is B; B is C; therefore A is C" is still valid regardless of whether we inductively expected it to be. Why? It is valid for the same reasons axioms are valid. Why are axioms extra-inductively valid? Axioms don't require inductive expectations for their validity because they are inescapably irrefutable.
Now, you said -- " Without induction, deduction has no 'meaning.' ." Yes, if by meaning you mean comprehension. That is, we comprehend stuff through induction. Just as we can't comprehend axioms if we don't induce them, neither will we comprehend deduction if we don't induce it. This is what I thought you meant by meaning. Really, though, who gives a crap, and what's this got to do with the raven paradox?
But if by meaning you mean use, then this makes no sense and is incoherent. Deduction has use and is used even if we don't induce it. A young child doesn't induce half the stuff she "uses." But she uses it nicely anyway. Specifically, a young child doesn't necessarily induce that "A is B; B is C; therefore A is C" is always true. But she relies on that deduction all the time, like when she accepts that Felix is an animal. She's relying on the deduction that "Felix is a cat, and a cat is an animal, so Felix is an animal." She didn't arrive at "Felix is an animal" from observing Felix's animal-ness again and again and again. Or at least, the burden is on you to provide evidence that "Felix is an animal" was arrived at through repeated observation (i.e., induction), which is why I asked for examples.
I really feel like I just rehashed what I already said. But hopefully this step-by-step will moves things ahead.
Jordan
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