| | Regarding Nozick's argument that the dominant protection agency may evolve from an ultra-minimal to a minimal state by using force (if need be) to restrain independents or their agents from enforcing justice with sub-optimal proceedures, Nozick is substantially yet not completely right. If one accuses another of stealing his car, but lacks objective evidence that the accused actually committed the theft, then the accusor's actions taken to enforce justice are themselves unjust. This is true even if the accusor's suspicions about the accused are accurate, because lacking such evidence the accusor cannot know whether taking action against the accused is justified, or whether taking such action will violate the rights of an innocent person.
The dominant agency that uses correct legal proceedures has the right to ensure that its clients are protected from independents who use unreliable and flawed proceedures as concerns the issue of guilt versus innocence. But does the dominant agency also have the right to restrict an independent using flawed proceedure against another independent?
I think not. The clients of the dominant agency pay for the protection of their own rights, not for the enforcement of "cosmic justice". If independents frequently engage in faulty legal proceedures, that risk would drive more clients into the protection of the dominant agency. On the other hand, if independents use correct legal proceedure, then it is likely that they would become integrated into a federation that upholds those standards of enforcement.
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